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NOTES AND COMMENTS

plants apparently within the scope of federal control,2 with many undeveloped power sites in private hands, with the absolute supremacy of
the federal power of eminent domain over persons and states,2 the vital
question of whether compensation is to include dam site adaptability
value should be decided. 30 If it is included, the public will have to pay
32
3
for it either in rates ' or on recapture after the end of fifty years.
But the principal case has not helped at all for it indicates that the
federal right involved may be recognized in a federal court but may be
ignored in a state court. In a dissenting opinion written after the
United States Supreme Court had affirmed the judgment of the Oklahoma Court, Chief Justice Hurst stated what must occur to all who
crave simplicity in the law: "I see no reason why the rule should not
be the same in both instances."' '
LEONARD S. PoWERs.
Evidence-Fornication and Adultery-Admissibility Under Statute
of Extrajudicial Confessions for Corroboration
The statute declaring fornication and adultery a crime1 concludes
with the following proviso: that the admissions or confessions of one
[participant] shall not be received in evidence against the other. The
statute has remained on the books in that same language since 1854,2
and the cases that have arisen under it are numerous. The interpretation given to the proviso had been regarded as well-settled-that it meant
exactly what it says. *Recently, however, the court went far toward
emasculating ninety-four years of construction in the case of State v.
Davis.3 Defendant, superintendent of an orphanage, and Lola Mae
Reeves, a fourteen-year-old girl in his charge, were indicted under the
statute. After the State had accepted the feme defendant's plea of noto
contendere, she was placed upon the stand where she testified, over defendant's objection, that she had had intercourse with the defendant on
at least six occasions during a certain three month's time. Marguerite
"1Gatchell, JurisdictionalProblems Under the Federal Water Power Act of
1920, 14 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 42 (1945).
"tDolan, supra, note 22, at 10; Recent Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 305 (1930).
" That it is no trifling matter is demonstrated by the principal case where the
difference in valuation of a little over 400 acres, with and without dam site
adaptability being considered, meant nearly a million dollars to the jury.
3141 STAT. 1073 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §§812, 813 (1946).
"41 STAT. 1071 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 844 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §807
(1946). The Supreme Court expressly refused to recognize these two factors as
having any bearing on the point.
" Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 201 P. 2d 225, 235 (Okla.
1947) (dissenting opinion).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-184 (1943).
'N. C. CODE c. 34, §45 (1854).
'229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948).
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Wooten, the orphanage matron, was allowed to testify that the ferne
defendant previously had made a similar confession to her. This, too,
was admitted over defendant's objection. Defendant was convicted,' and
on appeal he attacked the verdict and judgment principally on'the
grounds that the ferne defendant was rendered incompetent to testify
against him by the proviso in the statute, and also that the proviso was
disregarded to his prejudice in the admission of Miss Wooten's testimony. The conviction was upheld in a 4-3 decision, the majority being
of the opinion that the feme defendant was competent to testify, that
"the prohibition of the statute is directed not to the person testifying
but against the use in evidence of his previous admissions and confessions." It may be conceded that the case of State v. Phipps4 was
determinative of this point.
But then, after declaring the statute to inhibit the use of the extrajudicial confessions of one defendant against his co-defendant, the court
proceeded to hold that it was nevertheless competent to admit Miss
Wooten's testimony (as to the feme defendant's extrajudicial confession) for the purpose of corroboratingthe testimony of the feme defendant. This latter holding seems patently to ignore the language of
the proviso. The statute does not speak of purpose. The majority cited
two cases in support of its holding on this point, State v. McKeitwn 0
and State v. Gore,7 and while these cases admittedly support the bald
proposition that a witness's previous consistent statements are admissible
to corroborate his testimony on the stand (if restricted to this purpose),
neither case involved an indictment under a statute containing an inhibition similar to the one under consideration in the principal case. Hence
these cases are clearly distinguishable.
There are three possible explanations for the court's holding that the
use of such admissions and confessions is allowable if restricted to purposes of corroboration. First, in holding that the statutory inhibition
was directed not to the person testifying but to the use of his previous
admissions and confessions, the court admitted that such a construction
wras, in effect, to declare the proviso a mere codification of the general
'76 N. C. 203 (1877). After a nolle prosequi had been entered as to the
feme defendant, she was introduced as a witness against the male defendant. The
opinion, however, makes no mention of the statutory proviso under consideration
in the principal case. Apparently the general rules of evidence were held to be
controlling.
' Compare State v. Rinehart, 106 N. C. 787, 11 S. E. 512 (1890) (apparently
holding that the admissions or confessions of one defendant are not admissible
against the other defendant for any purpose) with State v. Roberts, 188 N. C.
460, 124 S. E. 833 (1924) (where admissions of the feme defendant were admitted because spoken in the presence of the male defendant).
6203 N. C. 494, 166 S. E. 336 (1932) (prosecution for procuring a person to
burn a dwelling house).
207 N. C. 618, 178 S. E. 209 (1934) (involved prosecution as accessory before
the fact of murder).
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rule of evidence which prohibits the use of such admissions and confessions as hearsay.8 But this "mere codification" idea gets out of- hand
when the court goes on to hold that the admissions and confessions of
one defendant are competent for purposes of corroboration simply because this is also the usual rule.9 Second, the holding might be justified
upon an examination of the theory behind the use of previous consistent
statements for purposes of corroboration. Such statements are available to establish the credibility of the witness, not as substantive evidence to prove the fact asserted in the confession,'0 and on this basis
it might be argued that they are not used against the defendant. But
this is pure theory. The practical result of such a practice is to use
them against the defendant if, without them, the witness will not be
believed by the jury." Third, the court in its haste to see justice done
might have felt the objection more technical than substantial. Since
the defendant could not show he was prejudiced by the testimony (how
could he ever show prejudice in such a case?), the verdict was not to
be overturned. But the statute is dear. If it has been disregarded, this
2
alone is reason enough to grant a new trial.'
JAmEs L. TAPLEY.
Insurance-Automobile Liability Policy-Scope of Loading
and Unloading Clause
The question of coverage afforded under "loading and unloading"
clauses, in automobile insurance policies has been a center of controversy
since the inception of such contracts.' The usual policy of this type
contains a liability clause for injuries sustained from accidents "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the vehicle, with "use"
further defined to include "loading and unloading."
In London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. C. B. White and Bros.2 the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia brings to focus the disputations
' Commonwealth v. Epps, 298 Pa. 377, 148 Ad. 523 (1930); State v. Allison,
175 Minn. 218, 220 N. W. 563 (1928); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1076 (3rd ed.

1940).
14

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1125-1126, 1131 (3rd ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §52 (1946 ed.).
10 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§51, 52 (1946 ed.).
" Justice Stacy dissented vigorously in the principal case, saying pointedly that
the suggestion that Miss Wooten's testimony was not offered against the defendant
"has at least the merit of novelty."
"2Hooper v. Hooper, 165 N.: C. 605, 81 S. E. 933 (1914); Broom v. Broom,
130 N. C. 562, 41 S. E. 673 (1902) ; State v. Gee, 92 N. C. 756, 762 (1885) ; State
v. Ballard, 79 N. C. 627 (1878).
'For other discussions on this problem of coverage see Gibson B. Witherspoon,
What Protection Is Afforded Under the "Loading and Unloading" Clause of an
Automobile Insurance Policy?, 52 Com. L. J. 58 (1947) ; see Note, 160 A. L. R.

1259 (1946).

249 S. E. 2d 254 (Va. 1948).

